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Abstract 
This paper finds strong evidence of non-linear impact of long-horizon expected government 
deficits, measured by CBO projections, on expected future long-term interest rates for the US 
economy. The impact of a shock to expectations (“news shock”) in a regime where the expected 
deficit/GDP ratio is above 1.8 % (the estimated threshold value) increases future nominal interest 
rates by 29-30 basis point, and future real rates by 12-18 basis points. When expected 
deficit/GDP ratio is below 1.8 %, a surprise increase in expectations of deficit has no statistically 
significant impact on future interest rates.  
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1. Introduction 
Economic theory posits that the effect of deficit on long term interest rates is an important 
channel through which deficit affect the real sector of the economy.  For instance, fluctuations in 
long term rates may impact interest-sensitive components of private spending such as housing 
and business fixed investment.  Hence, understanding how deficits impact long term rates is of 
policy interest.  
In extant literature, the relationship between deficit and long term interest rates has been 
extensively studied, but with ambiguous results. One major reason behind this ambiguity is due 
to the fact that deficit-interest relationship is confounded by the phenomenon that different 
policy measures, both monetary and fiscal, may impact deficit and interest rates 
contemporaneously. For example, if long-term interest rates fall due to monetary easing during 
recessions, while automatic stabilizers raise the deficit, deficits and interest rates may be 
negatively correlated even if the partial effect of deficits on interest rates - controlling for all 
other influences-  is positive.  Recent literature addresses this issue by accounting for the role of 
expectations about debt and deficit
2
 while estimating the aforementioned relationship.   
The dynamics of the relationship between deficit and long term interest rates is thus 
essentially an empirical question, which is what this paper tries to address. In this paper, I argue 
that it is also important to account for the possible nonlinearities in the relationship between long 
term interest rates and the level of expected deficit.  
In this paper I depart from the Laubach (2009) single-equation framework of deficit-interest 
rate relationship and incorporate threshold effects in expected deficits. Specifically, I estimate a 
threshold model where the level of threshold is unknown and is estimated along with other 
                                                          
Gale and Orszag (2002, 2003), Laubach (2009). 2  
parameters of the linear regression model. Using the estimated threshold level for expected 
deficit from this model, I specify and estimate a threshold VAR model to estimate response of 
future long term rates to structural shocks to deficit expectations, and allow this response to 
differ across the threshold levels.  
There are several findings of interest. First, similar to Laubach (2009), I find that expected 
deficit increases the future long term rate
3
. However, I also find that there is a significant 
threshold effect in this relationship. Specifically, the relationship between expected deficit and 
interest rate is only significant during the regime of high expected deficit. My estimated 
threshold level for the projected-deficit GDP ratio is 1.8 for the US economy. I find that for 
values of projected-deficit GDP ratio higher than this threshold level, a percentage point increase 
in the projected deficit GDP ratio increases future long term nominal interest rate by 30 basis 
points.  
Using the estimated threshold level from the single equation framework, I also run a 
Threshold VAR with other economic control variables. I find that a one standard deviation shock 
to projected deficits increases the real future long term interest rate by 16 basis points in a ‘high’ 
deficit regime for almost a period of 12 months before reverting to the mean. In contrast, in the 
‘low’ deficit regime the impact is negligible. This means that the impact of an innovation to 
projected deficit acts not only through the expected inflation channel, but directly on the 
economy’s real rate of return.  
One way to interpret the results of my Threshold VAR is to consider an innovation to the 
projected deficit variable as a revision of market’s expectation of future deficit. In a regime 
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long term rate as 5-10 year ahead forward rates.
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where economic agents already expect deficit to be high in the future, any revision of such 
projections will likely have large and significant impact on future interest rates (agents expect 
future interest rates to be high).This will not be the case when economic agents expect future 
deficit to be below a certain threshold value  
 
2. Related Literature 
Although several different surveys over the past twenty years have evaluated the literature on the 
relationship between federal government debt/deficit and interest rates
4
, the empirical evidence 
on the relationship between deficit and interest rates is at best mixed.  A survey of the literature 
by Seater (1993) finds support for the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis, which implies that 
federal government debt has no effect on interest rates. Barro (1989) takes a similar position as 
Seater (1993), concluding: "Overall, the empirical results on interest rates support the Ricardian 
view. Given these findings, it is remarkable that most macroeconomists remain confident that 
budget deficits raise interest rates." Bernheim (1989) on the other hand finds little evidence for 
the neutrality of government debt. Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) summarize this literature by 
stating that: ‘Our view is that this literature, like the literature regarding the effect of fiscal policy 
on consumption, is ultimately not very informative. Examined carefully, the results are simply 
too hard to swallow’.  
 A more recent survey paper by Gale and Orszag (2004) emphasizes that empirical study that 
(properly) incorporates deficit and debt expectations in addition to current deficit tends to find 
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economically and statistically significant connections between anticipated deficits and current 
long-term interest rates. A recent paper by Laubach (2009) explicitly focuses on long horizon 
forecasts of fiscal variables and interest rates. Laubach incorporates CBO deficit projections in 
his analysis as a proxy for expectations, and looks at the impact of the projections on future short 
and long interest rates, and finds significant positive relationship among these two variables.  
The literature on non-linearity in fiscal policy (mainly dealing with correctly estimating the 
size of government spending or tax multiplier during a recessionary regime and expansionary 
regime) is relatively new, with the most current and influential paper being Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko (2012). In their paper, the authors incorporate regime in GDP growth in keeping 
with their research question, and endogenously determine regime switches and estimate regime 
dependent multipliers in a VAR specification.  
Another paper which uses a more conventional Threshold VAR to incorporate non-linearity 
in fiscal policy is Candelon and Lieb (2011). Although structural VAR specifications have been 
the workhorse for finding out the impact of fiscal variables on monetary policy and vice versa
5
, 
the existence or estimation of non-linearity in their relationship is rare in the literature. One 
important reason for that is the small size of available historical fiscal data and the potential 
empirical issues that researchers might have to encounter with the large number of parameters 
generated in any non-linear model.  
The specific form of non-linearity that I am looking at is novel in two ways. Firstly, non-
linearity in the impact of expected deficit on interest rates has not been addressed in the literature 
to my knowledge. Secondly, although it is fairly straightforward to do a Threshold VAR where 
non-linearity in one of the variables can be endogenously determined, thereby generating regime 
dependent impulse responses following Tsay (1998), given the small sample size of government 
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deficit data, it is near to impossible to get any statistically meaningful results in a non-linear 
VAR with its numerous parameters. The empirical strategy of this study is to test for non-
linearity in expected deficit and estimate its threshold value in a simpler single equation 
framework using Hansen (2000) asymptotic method, which addresses the issue of the small 
sample size. I then use this estimated threshold value to create a dummy which I interact with the 
projected deficit variable in the VAR to corroborate my results from the single equation 
framework.  
 
3. Empirical Specifications 
In the absence of nominal rigidities in the economy, the real interest rate is equal to the “natural” 
rate of interest 𝑟𝑡
∗ and only deviates from it in the presence of nominal rigidities, where the short 
term rate takes the form 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1.
6
  Laubach (2009) is motivated by this theory to 
specify regressions for the real rate of the general form 𝑟𝑡
∗ = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑓𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 where 𝑓𝑡 is the given 
measure of fiscal policy, and 𝑢𝑡  denotes other factors affecting the natural rate (specifically, 
growth rate of per capita consumption, the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, and 
household’s rate of time preference). The observed real short-term interest rate can thus be 
written as 𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑓𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 + (𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡
∗) where the real-rate gap (𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡
∗) is unobserved, and is 
subsumed in the residual of a regression of the current interest rate on fiscal factors. But this 
gives rise to a potential endogeneity problem in a setting where the real rate gap varies over time 
due to, for example, countercyclical monetary policy, and while at the same time automatic 
stabilizers induce cyclical variation in the fiscal variable  𝑓𝑡 . However, since nominal rigidities 
are only temporary, for sufficiently long horizons 𝑘 the real rate gap should vanish in 
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expectation, that is 𝐸𝑡−𝑘(𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡
∗) = 0. One way to address this endogeneity problem is to focus 
on expectations of interest rates and fiscal variables sufficiently far into the future. My test for 
the existence of threshold and its estimation is thus run on a variant of Laubach’s regression, 
which takes the form:   
 
𝐸𝑡(𝑖𝑡+𝑘) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+𝑘) + 𝛽2𝐸𝑡(𝑓𝑡+𝑘) + 𝛽3𝐸𝑡(𝑢𝑡+𝑘) + 𝜀𝑡      1)  
where the dependent variable is the long-term nominal interest rate expected to prevail 𝑘 periods 
ahead, the coefficient 𝛽1 on expected inflation can be different from 1, and 𝑢𝑡  denotes additional 
regressors. The main interest is in the magnitude and statistical significance of 𝛽2 and especially 
whether it takes significantly different values in different regimes of the fiscal variable (in the 
case where regimes are present). 
In the following section (Section 4) I intend to specify one such stylized fact about the link 
between future long term rates and expected deficit/debt, mainly that there is an unambiguous 
threshold effect of expected deficit on future long term interest rate. In that section I also 
estimate the threshold and its confidence interval in a single equation regression framework of 
the type (1), and test whether there is a threshold effect of expected deficit/ debt on future long 
rates. In Section 5, I estimate a Threshold VAR using current and projected fiscal variables and 
future interest rates. My goal is to characterize the empirical relationship between future long-
term interest rates, expected debt and deficit, expected inflation and expected GDP growth rates, 
while placing as few theoretical restrictions on the system dynamics as possible. I summarize 
and conclude in Section 6. Before I look into the nature and results of threshold tests and the 
Threshold VAR, I describe the data in the next sub-section.  
 
  
data and their properties  
Following related literature
7
, I use Congressional Budget Office (CBO) published projections 
of debt, deficit  (𝐸𝑇𝑑𝑡+𝑘) and GDP growth rates  (𝐸𝑇𝑦𝑡+𝑘) as the fiscal variables, with the first 
two expressed as percentages of projected GNP or GDP, as a proxy for expectations of future 
fiscal policy. The forecast horizon is 5 years in the future, which is the longest horizon for which 
a reasonably long time series of projections is available. Consistent with the use of 5-year-ahead 
projections of fiscal variables by the CBO, the analysis focuses on forward rates 5 years ahead 
embedded in the term structure of interest rates. In other words, I use 5 year ahead 5-year 
forward rate (and 5 year ahead 10-year forward rate) 𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡+𝑘 , calculated from zero coupon yield 
curve dataset of Gurkanayak, Sack and Wright (2006), details of which are in Appendix A. A 
significant component of any movement in future long term rates would be that of inflation 
expectations (of matching maturity), and I use a measure of long horizon inflation expectations 
 𝐸𝑇𝜋𝑡+𝑘 composed of a spliced series from both survey data and models of professional 
forecasters over the time period of my sample (details in Appendix A). The series of interest 
rates and inflation expectations are shown in Figure 1. The unified budget deficit, debt and GDP 
projections used are at semi-annual frequency from 1985, rather than the annual frequency which 
goes back till 1976, since that way I get more observations in my sample. Also, I wanted to avoid 
the significantly higher volatility of projected deficit and expected inflation pre-1985 to influence 
my results.  
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In Figure 2, I show the CBO data on projected deficit, projected debt and projected GDP 
growth. For details on the forecast errors of the projections data and stationarity properties, refer 
to Laubach (2009) who gives a detailed exposition on the issue.  The projections are shown for 
the fiscal year in which they are made. Figures 11 and 12 provide some descriptive statistics of 
projected deficit/GDP ratio and projected GDP growth rates.  
 
4. Threshold Estimation 
The test for non-linear effects of expected debt on future interest rates based on an asymptotic 
distribution theory of threshold estimates in a regression developed by Hansen (2000). In a 
routine analysis of sub-sample stability of parameters of a regression of the form 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽
′𝑥𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡, 
either a threshold value to split the sample is specified, or in the case where such specification is 
lacking, some method is employed in its selection. Such practices can be formally treated as a 
special case of the threshold regression model. These take the form:  
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜃1
′ 𝑥𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡,            𝑞𝑡 ≤ 𝛾        2) 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜃2
′ 𝑥𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡,            𝑞𝑡 > 𝛾               3) 
 
where 𝑞𝑡 may be called the threshold variable, and is used to split the sample into two groups, 
which may be called “classes” or “regimes” depending on the context. 
Hansen (2000) develops an asymptotic approximation to the distribution of the least 
squares estimate 𝛾 of the threshold parameter 𝛾. The specification that I use to test for a 
threshold, as well as to search a threshold from information contained within the regression 
framework, is: 
 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
′𝑋𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡             4) 
 
where 𝑖𝑡 is the 5-year-ahead 5 year and 10 year interest rates (more easily visualized as 𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡+𝑘 
where 𝑘=5 in my case) and 𝑋𝑡 is a 𝑡 × 𝑙 , (𝑙 = 4) vector of explanatory variables[𝑑𝑡, 𝑦𝑡, 𝜋𝑡, 𝑒𝑝𝑡]. 
Although all the explanatory variables are denoted as current period time series for ease of 
notation, they should be more appropriately interpreted as expectation terms in the same vein as 
𝑖𝑡 i.e. 𝑑𝑡 denotes 𝐸𝑇𝑑𝑡+𝑘, 𝑦𝑡  denotes 𝐸𝑇𝑦𝑡+𝑘, 𝜋𝑡 denotes 𝐸𝑇𝜋𝑡+𝑘. As a proxy for expected debt, 
the series of CBO semi-annual 5- year ahead deficit projections constitute 𝑑𝑡, the series of CBO 
projections of GDP growth rates is what constitutes 𝑦𝑡, and the series of long term inflation 
expectations are captured by the variable 𝜋𝑡 . The imposition of the variable of 𝑒𝑝𝑡 in the 
regression (and in the VAR) is due to a different restriction. It denotes a time varying measure of 
relative risk aversion for the economy as a whole, defined as the dividend component of national 
income divided by the market value of corporate equities held (directly and indirectly) by 
households as reported in the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds data (details in Appendix A). 
To write Eq. 4 as a threshold regression of the type in Eq. 2 and Eq. 3, while still keeping 
the single equation framework, I define the dummy variable 𝑑𝑡(𝛾) = {𝑞𝑡 ≤ 𝛾} where {.} is the 
indicator function and 𝑞 can be any element of the vector X (in my case, its projected deficit 𝑑𝑡). 
Setting 𝑋𝑡(𝛾) = 𝑋𝑡𝑑𝑡(𝛾), I now have a threshold variant of Eq. 4.   
    
      𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1
′𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽2
′ 𝑋𝑡(𝛾) + 𝑒𝑡        5) 
 
where 𝛽1
′  is the equivalent of 𝜃2
′  in Eqs. 1-2. The regression parameters are then (𝛽1
′ , 𝛽2
′ , 𝛾)and 
the natural estimator is the Least Squares (LS).  Hansen’s asymptotic method then not only tests 
for the presence of threshold, but also estimates the confidence interval around the “true” 
threshold. Figure 3 and Figure 4 shows the F test for linearity in projected deficit in the 
regression framework specified above, and it shows that the null of no-threshold is rejected at 
5% for 5-year ahead 10 year interest rate and at 10% for 5-year-ahead 5 year interest rate.  
 
results of threshold estimation 
A common method to form confidence intervals for parameters is through the inversion of 
Wald or the t-statistics. Given that the sampling distribution of threshold parameter depends on 
unknown parameters since the threshold itself is not identified in some parameter space, the 
Wald statistic will have very poor finite sample behavior
8
. Hansen (2000) showed that under 
such circumstances, precise confidence interval can indeed be constructed using the likelihood 
ratio statistic 𝐿𝑅𝑛(𝛾) where 𝛾 is the threshold parameter.   
Figure 5 and Figure 6 displays the graph of the normalized (scaled to account for 
heteroskedasticity
9
) likelihood ratio sequence 𝐿𝑅𝑛
∗ (𝛾) as a function of the threshold in projected 
deficit. The LS estimate of 𝛾 is the value that minimizes these graphs, which occurs at 𝛾 = 1.800 
for both the cases. Table 1 elaborates the result of the threshold estimation and confidence 
interval construction. The 95% critical value is also plotted (the dotted line) so one can read off 
the asymptotic 95% confidence set from the graph where the 𝐿𝑅𝑛
∗ (𝛾) crosses the dotted line. 
These results show that there is reasonable evidence of 2 regime specification.   
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The impact of projected deficit on 5-year-ahead 5 year and 5-year-ahead 10 year interest 
rates, based on the regression in Equation 4 is shown in Table 2. In the full sample, a percentage 
point increase in projected deficit GDP ratio increases 5 year-ahead 5 year interest rates by 16 
basis points. This is close to what Laubach (2009) derives, which is typically a 22 basis point 
increase for a percentage point increase in projected deficit. Similarly, in the full sample, a 
percentage point increase in projected deficit GDP ratio increases 5-year-ahead 10 year interest 
rates by 18 basis points.  
Once I fix 𝛾 at the LS estimate of 1.8 and split the sample in two based on this value of 
projected deficit, my sample approximately splits in half. Running the same regression for the 
two subsamples divided on the basis of the threshold, I find some very interesting results. Table 
3.1 and 3.2 present the results of the regression (Equation 5). When projected deficit is below the 
threshold value of 𝛾 = 1.8 (I call this Regime 1), the impact of projected deficit becomes 
insignificant in both cases. In Regime 2, when projected deficit takes value higher than the 
threshold, a percentage point increase in projected deficit significantly raises 5-year-ahead 5 year 
interest rates by 30 basis points and 5-year-ahead 10 year interest rates by 29 basis points. The 
magnitude of the effect is thus more than double of what I get when I use the full sample (i.e. 
when I use a model in which I do not specify the presence of a threshold).    
In other words, in a regime of high expected deficit, the market’s reaction to increased future 
deficit will markedly differ from when expected deficit is below a certain threshold.  The 
economy’s expectation of future long term interest rates under the former scenario (being greater 
in magnitude and statistically significant) is thus different than under the later. This important 
distinction contains a new and important piece of information for the policy process. It is that the 
impact of expected deficit on future interest rates, and thus national savings and GDP, might be 
small or ambiguous during a period of low and low expected deficit (where outlay plans plus net 
interest payments does not exceed planned tax revenues by a certain threshold amount), but is 
clear and significantly large in a period of high or high expected deficit (where government 
outlay including net interest payments exceed tax revenue over a threshold value).   To 
investigate the nature of the impact on future interest rates of expected deficit, I now carry out a 
Threshold VAR, so that that I can introduce richer dynamics among the variables. The 
specification of the Threshold VAR and impulse responses are discussed in the next section. 
 
5. Threshold VAR 
Threshold VARs are piecewise linear models with different autoregressive matrices in each 
regime. The regimes are determined by a transition variable, which is either one of the 
endogenous variables or an exogenous variable, as in Hansen (1996, 1997) and Tsay (1998). In 
general it is possible to obtain more than one critical threshold value and therefore more than two 
regimes, but since Hansen (2000) test generates one threshold value for my data on deficit, I will 
work with only two regimes.  
Let a set of 𝑘 stationary endogenous variables with 𝑥𝑡 = (𝑥1𝑡, … . , 𝑥𝑘𝑡)
′ and 𝑇 
observations describe a VAR of finite order 𝑝  
 
𝑥𝑡 = Γ0 + Γ1𝑥𝑡−1 + ⋯ + Γ𝑝𝑥𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑢𝑡       6) 
 
where 𝛤0 is a 𝑘-dimensional vector containing deterministic terms such as a constant, a linear 
time trend or dummy variables. 𝛤𝑖   with   𝑖 =  1, . . . , 𝑝  are squared coefficient matrices of order 
𝑘, and 𝑢𝑡 is a sequence of serially uncorrelated random vectors with mean zero and covariance 
matrix 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑢𝑡)  =  𝛴𝑢. I can rewrite equation (6) in the compact form 
 
 𝑥𝑡 = 𝛤𝑋𝑡  +  𝑢𝑡             7) 
 
 
With  𝛤 =  (𝛤0, 𝛤1, . . . , 𝛤𝑝) and    𝑋𝑡  =  (1, 𝑥𝑡−1, . . . , 𝑥𝑡−𝑝)′. Following this notation, a threshold 
VAR is represented by 
 
𝑥𝑡  =  𝛤1𝑋𝑡  + 𝛤2𝑋𝑡𝐼[𝑧𝑡−𝑑  ≥  𝑧
∗] +  𝑢𝑡       8) 
 
𝑧𝑡−𝑑   is the threshold variable determining the prevailing regime of the system, with a possible 
lag 𝑑. 𝐼[·] is an indicator function that equals 1 if the threshold variable 𝑧𝑡−𝑑  is above the 
threshold value 𝑧∗ and 0 otherwise. The coefficient matrices 𝛤1 and  𝛤2  , as well as the 
contemporaneous error matrix 𝑢𝑡   are allowed to vary across regimes. Although conventional 
Threshold VARs, following Tsay’s (1998) influential paper on the topic, treat the delay lag 𝑑 
and critical threshold value  𝑧∗ as unknown parameters to be estimated, I treat them differently. 
Given my small sample size and the multitude of parameters that a VAR would estimate (more 
so in a Threshold VAR), I treat my threshold value as known. Specifically, I use the threshold 
value of deficit that I estimated using the Hansen (2000) methodology. Not only is Hansen’s 
method more robust to small sample size, the asymptotic theory developed by Hansen aids in the 
construction of confidence interval around the estimated threshold value, which Tsay’s test does 
not allow for. The choice of 𝑑 in Threshold VAR usually relies on economic reasoning. I 
estimate the VAR using semi-annual data with a known value of 𝑧∗ = 𝛾 = 1.8 and restrict 𝑑 to 
be zero i.e. Eq. 8 can be re written as 
 
𝑥𝑡  =  𝛤1𝑋𝑡  + 𝛤2𝑋𝑡𝐼[𝑧𝑡−𝑑  ≥  𝛾] +  𝑢𝑡       9) 
 
where  𝛾 = 1.8. Conventional non-linear specification of VAR often includes an additional 
variable to distinguish between the regime of interest (example: some transformation of output 
gap to indicate “good” and “bad” times in fiscal VAR literature10). An important distinction 
between my specifications from those used in the literature is that I do not introduce such 
additional variable, instead restricting one of the endogenous variable of the VAR (projected 
deficit) to be the threshold variable.  Although introducing a measure of output gap as a 
threshold variable would be fairly straightforward, the nature of the question that I am asking 
makes such a measure problematic. Government budget deficit, both current and projected, is 
counter-cyclical and would generally have relatively higher values during recessions. If I use 
output gap as a threshold variable as is the practice in non-linear fiscal VAR literature, I would 
be creating an endogeneity problem. Also, when I ran the asymptotic test in the single equation 
framework of the type in Eq.5, I found no non-linear effect of expected output gap on future long 
term interest rates.  
In my version of threshold VAR, 𝑥𝑡 = [𝑅𝑟𝑡, 𝑑𝑡, 𝑦𝑡], where all the variables are those that 
were used in the single equation regression, except  𝑅𝑟𝑡, which is the real 5 year ahead 5 year 
interest rate (which is obtained by subtracting the expected long term inflation from the nominal 
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forward rates i.e.  𝑅𝑟𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 ). Again, the expectational nature of the variables is implicit in 
the notation, as explained in the Section 3.  
I couch my main results in the form of impulse-response functions (IRFs henceforth), 
estimated in the usual way. I compute 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 1000 
replications, and focus my discussion on significant responses. I report the resulting structural 
impulse-response functions in Figs. 7-10.  
results of threshold VAR 
Using an estimated threshold value of 1.8 for the projected deficit-GDP ratio, the Threshold 
VAR corroborates my findings from the single equation framework and provides a new insight.  
The impulse responses show that a Cholesky one standard deviation shock to projected deficit 
increases the real future long term interest rate by 12 basis points in a ‘high’ deficit regime 
(projected deficit-GDP ratio greater than 1.8). This increase is persistent for almost a year and 
half before reverting back to its mean.  In the “low” deficit regime, the impact is a small 3 basis 
point drop in the real rate, which reverts back to its pre-innovation level in 6 months’ time.  
The impact of an innovation to projected deficit on real rates indicates that the deficit-interest 
dynamics acts not only through the expected inflation channel, but directly on the economy’s 
real rate of return. One way to interpret the results of my Threshold VAR is to consider an 
innovation to the projected deficit variable as a revision of market’s expectation of future deficit 
that is independent of the CBO’s forecast. The smyce of the shock can also be thought of as 
some information private to CBO which becomes public. In a regime where economic agents 
already expect deficit to be high in the future, any revision of such projections will likely have 
large and significant impact on future real interest rates (agents expect future interest rates to be 
high). This will not be the case when economic agents expect future deficit to be below a certain 
threshold value. The VAR structure, while imposing the minimum if theoretical restrictions on 
the dynamics, controls for the fact that some part of projected deficit will have to incorporate 
future interest payments and GDP growth rates. It also enables us to look at the impact of an 
innovation to expected deficit on future real rates, which a single equation set up does not.  
 
 
robustness checks 
To see how robust my results are to the nature of data as well as specifications of the single 
equation regression and Threshold VAR, I carry out the entire exercise using an alternative 
measure of equity premium and using additional data on government spending projections and 
projections error in my VAR. The results of such exercises are qualitatively and quantitatively 
similar to what I present in my main results, both in the single equation Threshold estimation 
model and in the VAR. I also test the sensitivity of my result in the single equation to the 
threshold value of deficit/GDP that is estimated. Specifically, I carry out the threshold regression 
and the VAR using values of threshold around the neighborhood of 1.8, and find my result to be 
robust to such specification. The VAR impulse responses are also robust to different ordering of 
the variables in the Cholesky ordering as long as I order slower moving variables last
11
.   
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper I document empirical evidence in favor of significant non-linearity in the deficit-
interest rate relationship in the US economy. When I test for a threshold effect in the impact of 
fiscal deficit expectations on future long term interest rates, I find presence of significant 
threshold that can be used to explore the deficit-interest rate relationship in two regimes. In the 
                                                          
Results are available on request
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“low-regime”, when the economy’s expectation of future fiscal deficit is low, deficits will have a 
negligible impact on long term interest rates. However, this effect is positive and significant 
(both economically and statistically) in the “high-regime”, when the economy expects that future 
deficit will be higher than a certain threshold (a deficit-GDP ratio of 1.8). The size of the impact 
is 30 basis points for one percentage point increase in expected deficit/GDP ratio. I utilize the 
estimated threshold value of deficit and run a threshold VAR to explore the dynamics of the 
impact of a structural shock to deficit expectations on long term rates.  A structural shock to 
deficit expectations can be interpreted as a revision to Congressional Budget Office (hence the 
market’s) forecast of future revenue and spending scenario (the timing of taxes or the path of 
government spending). The result of this paper suggests that any such revision will have 
significant impact on future interest rates (hence future investment, consumption and savings) in 
a scenario where expectations of deficit are already high.  
This evidence is not only interesting to policymakers in designing debt stabilization strategies 
but it can also help reconcile conflicting predictions about the effects of deficit on interest rates 
across different types of macroeconomic models. A novel implication of my result is that it 
might be worthwhile for policymakers to incorporate management of deficit-expectations in their 
policymaking framework. For instance, it may be beneficial to announce the path of government 
spending and taxes with some regularity and make this announcement reasonably visible for 
agents in the economy.  This will be especially effective in a scenario of high deficit 
expectations, where an upward revision (“bad news”) of deficit projections have the potential to 
increase future interest rates. In so far as high deficit and debt dampen the Fed’s monetary policy 
effectiveness, this might be a prudent cmyse of action for fiscal policymakers.  Finally, I believe 
that my empirical result can be used as a motivation for future theoretical work to develop 
realistic dynamic stochastic general equilibrium class models that account for the non-linearity 
between deficit and interest rate to better understand the forces driving differences in the impact 
of deficit expectations on future interest rates during different regimes, the exact dynamics and 
consequences of such impact and policy implications of managing expectations of deficit.   
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TABLE 1 
Threshold estimation in regression using 5-year-ahead 5 year interest rate and 5-year-ahead 10-year 
interest rate as the dependent variable 
 
Dependent Variable  5-year-ahead 5 year 
interest rate 
5-year-ahead 10 year 
interest rate 
Threshold Estimate 𝑑𝑡: 1.800 1.800 
0.95 Confidence Interval: [-0.319 , 2.691] [-0.319 , 2.691] 
Sum of Squared Errors:  20.670 18.45 
Joint R-squared: 0.885 .887 
Heteroskedasticity Test  (P-Value) 0.657 .704 
Note:  dt is projected deficit-GDP ratio. 
 
TABLE 2 
 Regression of future interest rate on projected deficit and other regressors:  
Full sample 
 
Dependent Variable  5-year-ahead                   
5 year interest rate 
5-year-ahead                
10 year interest rate 
Variable Estimate  Estimate 
   
Constant 3.226 (0.869) 3.339(0.888) 
𝜋𝑡 (projected inflation) 1.619(0.124) 1.521(0.116) 
𝑦𝑡( projected GDP growth rate) -0.592(0.331) -0.456(0.331) 
𝑑𝑡 (projected deficit-GDP ratio) 0.163(0.052) 0.181(0.051) 
   
Sum of Squared Errors:  28.915 26.752 
R-squared: 0.83 0.84 
Heteroskedasticity Test  (P-Value) 0.035 0.008 
 
TABLE 3.1 
Regression of future interest rates on projected deficit and other regressors: 
Split Sample (Regime 1) 
 
Regime 1: 𝒅𝒕 ≤ 𝟏. 𝟖   
Dependent Variable 5-year-ahead                       
5 year  interest rate 
5-year-ahead 10 year 
interest rate 
Parameter Estimates   
Variable Estimate  Estimate 
Constant 3.56 (0.89) 3.39(0.81) 
𝜋𝑡 (projected inflation) 1.35(0.12) 1.31(0.12) 
𝑦𝑡( projected GDP growth rate) -0.49(0.31) -0.32(0.31) 
𝑑𝑡 (projected deficit-GDP ratio) -0.18(0.21) 0.00(0.06) 
   
Observations: 30 30 
   
Sum of Squared Errors:  11.37 11.09 
Residual Variance 0.45 0.43 
R-squared: 0.80 0.82 
 
  
 TABLE 3.2 
Regression of future interest rates on projected deficit and other regressors:  
Split Sample (Regime 2) 
 
Regime 2: 𝒅𝒕 > 𝟏. 𝟖   
Dependent Variable 5-year-ahead 5 year 
interest rate 
5-year-ahead 10 year 
interest rate 
Parameter Estimates   
Variable Estimate  Estimate 
Constant 3.05(0.92) 3.15(0.90) 
𝜋𝑡 (projected inflation) 1.92(0.15) 1.83(0.15) 
𝑦𝑡( projected GDP growth rate) -0.95(0.39) -0.81(0.40) 
𝑑𝑡 (projected deficit-GDP ratio) 0.30(0.13) 0.29(0.14) 
   
Observations: 25 25 
   
Sum of Squared Errors:  8.12 7.36 
Residual Variance 0.38 0.35 
R-squared: 0.90 0.91 
Note: Boot-strapped standard errors in parenthesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.Interest Rates and Long Horizon Inflation Expectations 
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Figure 2.Projected Deficit and Projected GDP Growth Rates (year of projection) 
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Figure 3.  90% F Test for presence of Threshold effect of expected deficit on 5-year-ahead 5 year interest 
rates 
 
 
Note: Linearity is rejected if F sequence becomes greater than or equal to the 90% critical value. For 5-
year-ahead 5 year interest rates, the bootstrapped P-value for F sequence greater than 95% critical is 
0.052; hence the line just about touches the 95% critical, but crosses the 90% critical line.  
 
  
Figure 4. 95% F Test for presence of Threshold effect of expected deficit on 5-year-ahead 10 year interest 
rates 
 
 
Note: Linearity is rejected if F sequence becomes greater than or equal to the 95% critical value.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.Confidence interval construction for threshold in Deficit/GDP ratio while regressing on 5-year-
ahead 5 year interest rate 
 
 
  
Figure 6.Confidence interval construction for threshold in Deficit/GDP ratio while regressing on 5-year-
ahead 10 year interest rate 
 
  
 
  
Figure 7.Response of 5-year-ahead 5 year Interest Rate to One S.D. Innovation to Projected Deficit-GDP 
ratio in Regime 1 ("regime of low expected deficit") 
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Figure 8.Response of 5-year-ahead 5 year Interest Rate to One S.D. Innovation to Projected Deficit-GDP 
ratio in Regime 2 ("regime of high expected deficit") 
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Figure 9.Response of 5-year-ahead 10 year Interest Rate to One S.D. Innovation to Projected Deficit-GDP 
ratio in Regime 1 ("regime of low expected deficit") 
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Figure 10.Response of 5-year-ahead 10 year Interest Rate to One S.D. Innovation to Projected Deficit-
GDP ratio in Regime 2 ("regime of high expected deficit") 
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Figure 11.Summary Statistics of Projected Deficit/GDP Ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Series: Projected Deficit GDP Ratio
Sample: 1985 - 2012
Frequency: Semi-annual
Mean       1.184733
Median   1.719861
Maximum  5.288041
Minimum -3.802997
Std. Dev.   1.931046
Skewness  -0.645207
Kurtosis   3.086528
Jarque-Bera  3.833164
Probability  0.147109
  
Figure 12.Descriptive Statistics of Projected GDP/GNP Growth Rates 
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 Appendix A 
 
Data Description:  
 
Expected Inflation:  the series is spliced using data from fmy smyces: 
 January 1960 – September 1980: the inflation endpoint constructed by Kozicki and 
Tinsley (JME 2001); 
 October 1980 – October 1991: linearly interpolated data from Hoey is used after 
subtracting 0.55 percentage point (annual rate) to transform the data from a CPI inflation 
basis to a PCE inflation basis; 
 November 1991 – 2005: linearly interpolated SPF survey data is used after subtracting 
0.55 percentage point (annual rate) to transform the data from a CPI inflation basis to a 
PCE inflation basis. 
 November 2005- January 2012: Inflation expectations from Cleveland Fed using a new 
approach to gauging private sector inflation expectations of various horizons. See 
commentary of Haubrich, J at Cleveland Fed:  
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2009/0809.cfm 
 
5 year-ahead 5 year interest rate:  
Average of one-year forward rates 5-9 years ahead, calculated from the zero coupon yield curve, 
sampled on the last trading day of the month of the CBO release.  
 
5 year-ahead 10 year interest rate:  
Average of one-year forward rates 5-14 years ahead, calculated from the zero coupon yield 
curve, sampled on the last trading day of the month of the CBO release. 
 
Equity Premium:  Calculated as the dividend component of national income, expressed as 
percent of the market value of corporate equity held (directly or indirectly) by households 
Smyce: Flow of Funds account in FRED database. 
  
